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Abstract
We investigate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy using a Bayesian Structural 
Vector Autoregression approach. We build on a recursive identification scheme, but we: 
(i) include the feedback from government debt (ii); look at the impact on the composition 
of output; (iii) assess the effects on asset markets (via housing and stock prices); (iv) add 
the exchange rate; (v) assess potential interactions between fiscal and monetary policy; 
(vi) use quarterly data, particularly, fiscal data; and (vii) analyze empirical evidence from 
the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Italy. The results show that government spending 
shocks, in general, have a small effect on GDP; lead to important “crowding-out” effects; 
have a varied impact on housing prices and generate a quick fall in stock prices; and lead 
to a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate. Government revenue shocks 
generate a small and positive effect on both housing prices and stock prices that later 
mean reverts; and lead to an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. The 
empirical evidence also shows that it is important to explicitly consider the government 
debt dynamics in the model. 
Keywords: fiscal policy, Bayesian Structural VAR, debt dynamics 
JEL Classification: C11, C32, E62, H62 
5
ECB
Working Paper Series No 991
January 2009
Non-technical summary 
This paper provides a detailed evaluation of the effects of fiscal policy on 
economic activity. First, we consider the effects of fiscal policy on the composition of 
GDP, namely, by estimating the impact of government spending and government 
revenue shocks on private consumption and private investment. Consequently, we are 
able to identify the potential “crowding-out” effects of fiscal policy on the private 
sector. Second, we also ask how stock prices and housing prices are affected by fiscal 
policy shocks. To the extent that we find a link between them, we look at the 
persistence of the effects and assess whether the reaction is quantitatively similar and/or 
exhibits asymmetry instead. Third, we look at the impact of fiscal policy on the external 
sector via the effects on exchange rate. Fourth, we analyze the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks on the growth rate of monetary aggregates, therefore, assessing the existence of 
a credit channel in the transmission of the shocks and wealth effects associated to the 
changes in the (long-term) interest rate. 
Another novelty of the paper is that we explicitly include the feedback from 
government debt in our estimations. In fact, while equilibrium structural models are 
normally solved by imposing the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, that 
does not happen with VAR-based fiscal policy models. We deal with this limitation of 
previous literature by considering the response of fiscal variables to the level of the 
debt. 
In addition, an important contribution of the paper is the use of quarterly fiscal 
data, which allows us to identify more precisely the effects of fiscal policies. We 
analyze empirical evidence from the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Italy, respectively, 
for the periods 1970:3-2007:4, 1964:2-2007:4, 1980:3-2006:4, and 1986:2-2004:4. The 
set of quarterly fiscal data, is taken from national accounts (in the case of the U.S. and 
the U.K.) or computed by drawing on the higher frequency (monthly) availability of 
fiscal cash data (for Germany and Italy). To the best of our knowledge the use of such 
fiscal data set has not yet been used in this strand of economic modelling.    
The most relevant findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. 
Government spending shocks (i) have, in general, a small effect on GDP; (ii) do not 
impact significantly on private consumption; (iii) have a negative effect on private 
investment; (iv) have a varied effect on housing prices that ranges from a positive and 
persistent effect to a negative effect and gradual recovery according to the country 
under consideration, a pattern that depends on the effect on (long-term) interest rates; 
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(v) lead to a quick fall in stock prices; (vi) do not impact significantly on the price level 
and the average cost of refinancing the debt; (vii) have a small and positive effect on the 
growth rate of monetary aggregates; (viii) lead to a depreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate; and (ix) have a positive and persistent impact on productivity.  
On the other hand, government revenue shocks:  (i) have a positive (although 
lagged) effect on GDP and private investment, as a result of the fiscal consolidation; (ii) 
a positive effect on both housing prices and stock prices that later mean reverts, but the 
exact impact depends on the effects on (long-term) interest rates; (iii) in general, do not 
have an impact on the price level; and (iv) lead to an appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate. 
When we explicitly take into account the feedback from government debt in our 
framework, the effects of fiscal policy on (long-term) interest rates and GDP become 
more persistent and these variables are also more responsive to the shock. Finally, the 
results do not seem to support the existence of important stabilizing effects of the debt 




















Working Paper Series No 991
January 2009
1. Introduction 
Compared to the large empirical literature on the effects of monetary policy on 
economic activity, fiscal policy has received less attention, a feature that contrasts with 
the public debates on its role. The government deficit and debt limits of the Stability 
and Growth Pact in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 
possibility of independent institutions running fiscal policy, the creation of fiscal policy 
committees, the influence of regulation in the structure of market incentives, and the 
Balanced Budget Amendment in the U.S., are based on the assumption that fiscal policy 
can be an effective tool for stabilizing business cycles.  
This paper provides a detailed evaluation of the effects of fiscal policy on 
economic activity. First, we consider the effects of fiscal policy on the composition of 
GDP, namely, by estimating the impact of government spending and government 
revenue shocks on private consumption and private investment as in Gali et al. (2007). 
Consequently, we are able to identify the potential “crowding-out” effects of fiscal 
policy on the private sector. Second, we also ask how asset markets (via stock prices 
and housing prices) are affected by fiscal policy shocks. To the extent that we find a 
link between them, we look at the persistence of the effects and assess whether the 
reaction is quantitatively similar and/or exhibits asymmetry instead. Third, we look at 
the impact of fiscal policy on the external sector through the effects on exchange rate in 
line with Monacelli and Perotti (2006). Fourth, we analyze the effects of fiscal policy 
shocks on the growth rate of monetary aggregates, therefore, assessing the existence of 
a credit channel in the transmission of the shocks and the wealth effects associated to 
the changes in the (long-term) interest rate. In practice, we aim at assessing the potential 
interaction between fiscal policy and monetary policy in the spirit of Davig and Leeper 
(2005), Chung et al. (2007), and Gali and Monacelli (2008). Fifth, we look at the impact 
of fiscal policy on the labour market, namely, by assessing its impact on wages and 
productivity. 
We identify fiscal policy shocks using a recursive identification scheme and 
estimate a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) model, therefore, 
accounting for the posterior uncertainty of the impulse-response functions.1 
Another novelty of the paper is that we explicitly include the feedback from 
government debt in our estimations. In fact, while equilibrium structural models are 
                                                 
1 Christiano et al. (2005) use a recursive identification scheme to identify the monetary policy shock. We 
follow the same approach but in the context of identification of the fiscal policy shock. 
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normally solved by imposing the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (see 
Chung and Leeper, 2007), this does not happen with VAR-based fiscal policy models. 
We deal with this limitation of previous literature by following Favero and Giavazzi 
(2008), and, as a result, we consider the response of fiscal variables to the level of the 
government debt. 
In addition, an important contribution of the paper is the use of quarterly fiscal 
data, which allows us to identify more precisely the effects of fiscal policies. We 
analyze empirical evidence from the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Italy, respectively, 
for the periods 1970:3-2007:4, 1964:2-2007:4, 1980:3-2006:4, and 1986:2-2004:4. The 
set of quarterly fiscal data, is taken from national accounts (in the case of the U.S. and 
the U.K.) or computed by drawing on the higher frequency (monthly) availability of 
fiscal cash data (for Germany and Italy). To the best of our knowledge, such fiscal data 
set has not yet been used in this strand of economic modelling.    
The most relevant findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. 
Government spending shocks (i) have, in general, a small effect on GDP; (ii) do not 
impact significantly on private consumption; (iii) have a negative effect on private 
investment; (iv) have a varied effect on housing prices that ranges from a positive and 
persistent effect to a negative effect and gradual recovery according to the country 
under consideration, a pattern that depends on the effect on (long-term) interest rates; 
(v) lead to a quick fall in stock prices; (vi) do not impact significantly on the price level 
and the average cost of refinancing the debt; (vii) have a small and positive effect on the 
growth rate of monetary aggregates; (viii) lead to a depreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate; and (ix) have a positive and persistent impact on productivity.  
On the other hand, government revenue shocks:  (i) have a positive (although) 
lagged) effects on GDP and private investment, as a result of the fiscal consolidation; 
(ii) a positive effect on both housing prices and stock prices that later mean reverts, but 
the exact impact depends on the effects on (long-term) interest rates; (iii) in general, do 
not have an impact on the price level; and (iv) lead to an appreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate. 
When we explicitly take into account the feedback from government debt in our 
framework, the effects of fiscal policy on (long-term) interest rates and GDP become 
more persistent and these variables are also more responsive to the shock. Finally, the 
results do not seem to support the existence of a significant stabilizing response of the 
budget balance to the debt level. In fact, there is only weak evidence suggesting that: (i) 
9
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government spending falls when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above its mean (for the U.S. 
and Italy in the second half of the sample); and (ii) government revenue increases when 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is above its mean (in the case of the U.K. and only for the second 
half of the sample). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related 
literature. Section three explains the empirical strategy used to identify the effects of 
fiscal policy shocks, and to take into account the uncertainty regarding the posterior 
impulse-response functions. Section four provides the empirical analysis and discusses 
the results. Section five concludes with the main findings and policy implications. 
 
2. Literature 
Despite the large literature on the impact of monetary policy on economic 
activity, fiscal policy has received less attention and its importance for economic 
stabilization has been typically neglected. The recent financial turmoil has, however, 
revived the interest of academia, central bankers and governments on the role of fiscal 
policy. 
We review in this section the existing evidence of the effects on the composition 
of output, on housing and stock prices, on long-term interest rates, on exchange rates, 
and on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. 
 
Composition of output 
For the U.S., different approaches have been used in the identification of the 
fiscal policy shock. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a “narrative approach” to isolate 
political events, and find that, after a brief rise in government spending, nondurable 
consumption displays a small decline while durables consumption falls. Following the 
same approach, Edelberg et al. (1999) show that episodes of military build-ups have a 
significant and positive short-run effect on U.S. output and consumption, and that the 
sign of the response does not change when anticipation effects are taken into account. 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) use a Cholesky ordering to identify fiscal shocks and show that 
increases in government expenditures are expansionary, but lead to an increase in 
private investment that more than compensates for the fall in private consumption.2 
                                                 
2 This result goes against the empirical findings of the standard RBC model, which generally predicts a 
decline in private consumption in response to a rise in government spending. With infinitely-lived 
Ricardian households, an increase in government spending lowers the present value of after-tax income, 
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use information about the elasticity of fiscal variables to 
identify the automatic response of fiscal policy, and find that expansionary fiscal shocks 
increase output, have a positive effect on private consumption, and a negative impact on 
private investment. More recently, using sign restrictions on the impulse-response 
functions and identifying the unexpected variation in government spending by a positive 
response of expenditure for up to four quarters after the shock, Mountford and Uhlig 
(2005) find a negative effect in residential and non-residential investment.3 
Similar studies applied to other countries are relatively scarce, largely due to the 
limited availability of quarterly public finance data, and, in addition, do not provide a 
consensual view. Perotti (2004) investigates the effects of fiscal policy in Australia, 
Canada, Germany and the U.K., and finds a relatively large positive effect on private 
consumption and no response of private investment. Biau and Girard (2005) find a 
cumulative multiplier of government spending larger than one, and positive reactions of 
private consumption and private investment in France. De Castro and Hernández de Cos 
(2006) use data for Spain and show that, while there is a positive relationship between 
government expenditure and output in the short-term, in the medium and long-term 
expansionary spending shocks only lead to higher inflation and lower output. Heppke-
Falk et al. (2006) use cash data for Germany, and find that a positive shock in 
government spending increases output and private consumption, although the effect is 
relatively small. Giordano et al. (2007) show that, in Italy, government expenditure has 
positive and persistent effects on output and on private consumption. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
and thus generates a negative wealth effect on consumption (Aiyagari et al., 1990; Baxter and King, 1993; 
Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; and Fatás and Mihov, 2001). It also induces a rise in the quantity of 
labour supplied at any given wage, leading to a lower real wage, and higher employment and output. If 
persistent, the increase in employment leads to a rise in the expected return of capital, and may boost 
investment (Gali et al., 2007). In contrast, the IS-LM model predicts that consumption should rise in 
response to a positive government spending shock. When consumers behave in a non-Ricardian fashion, 
their consumption is a function of their current disposable income. The effect of an increase in 
government spending will depend on how it is financed, and on the response of investment (Blanchard, 
2003). Under the assumption of a constant money supply, the rise in consumption is followed by an 
investment decline (due to a higher interest rate). If the central bank holds the interest rate constant, the 
effect on investment is nil. 
3 Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) have uncovered the presence of “non-
Keynesian effects” (i.e., negative spending multipliers) during large fiscal consolidations, with output 
rising significantly despite large cuts in government spending. Perotti (1999) also obtains such findings, 
but only in circumstances of “fiscal stress” (unusually high debt-to-GDP ratios). In addition, Afonso 
(2008c) suggests that there is some evidence in favour of the existence of expansionary fiscal 
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Housing prices 
Despite the analysis of the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables 
(such as GDP, consumption and its components, or investment and its components), and 
the empirical importance of housing over the business cycle, there are only a small 
number of papers that discuss the empirical link between economic policy and housing 
prices, and the focus has mainly been on the effects of monetary policy. 
McCarthy and Peach (2002) show that the magnitude of the response of 
residential investment in the U.S. to a change in monetary policy has not changed over 
time despite the fundamental restructuring of the housing finance system. Chirinko et al. 
(2004) study the relationship between stock prices, house prices, and real activity, but 
focus on the role that asset prices play in the formulation of monetary policy. Iacoviello 
and Minetti (2003) emphasize the housing market as creating a credit channel for 
monetary policy. Aoki et al. (2004) argue that there is a collateral transmission 
mechanism to consumption. Iacoviello (2005) looks at the monetary policy-house price 
to consumption channel and finds a significant effect on house prices. Iacoviello and 
Neri (2007) show that housing prices are very sensitive to monetary policy shocks. 
Julliard et al. (2007) suggest that monetary policy contractions have a large and 
significantly negative impact on real housing prices, but the reaction is extremely slow. 




As with housing prices, the link between fiscal policy and stock markets has not 
been explored yet, and the attention has been normally targeted towards the role played 
by monetary policy. 
Rigobon and Sack (2002, 2003) and Craine and Martin (2003) use a 
heteroskedasticity-based estimator and find a significant response of the stock market to 
shocks in the interest. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) show that a hypothetical 
unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the Federal funds rate target is associated with about 
a 1% increase in broad stock indexes. 
  
Long-term interest rates 
Gale and Orszag (2003) argue that there are two important reasons for why 
budget deficits may raise nominal interest rates: (i) public deficits reduce aggregate 
12
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savings when private savings do not increase by the same amount (i.e. in the absence of 
Ricardian equivalence) and there are no compensating foreign capital inflows, therefore, 
leading to a decrease in the supply of capital; and (ii) deficits increase the stock of 
government debt and, consequently, the outstanding amount of government bonds 
(relative to other financial assets). In this case, there is a “portfolio effect”, as a higher 
interest rate on government bonds would be required in order to incentive investors to 
hold the additional bonds.  
While some studies find that interest rates tend to increase after a rise in the 
deficit, others do not (Engen and Hubbard, 2004). The empirical findings seem to 
depend on whether expected or current budget deficits are used as explanatory variables 
(Upper and Worms, 2003; Brook, 2003; Laubach, 2003), and also on whether yield 
differentials in Europe with respect to Germany (Codogno et al., 2003) or interest rate 
swap spreads are used as the dependent variable (Goodhart and Lemmen, 1999; Afonso 
and Strauch, 2007). 
For Europe, the existing evidence points either to a significant (although small) 
effect (Bernoth et al., 2003; Codogno et al., 2003; Afonso and Strauch, 2007; Faini, 
2004), or to the absence of impact (Heppke-Falk and Hüfner, 2004). For the U.S., the 
effect seems to be substantially larger (Gale and Orszag, 2002). 
 
 Exchange rates 
Kim and Roubini (2003) show that a budget deficit shock leads to an 
improvement in the trade balance. Corsetti and Müller (2006) assess the response of the 
trade, while Perotti and Monacelli (2006) focus on the joint response of trade balance, 
consumption and real exchange rate. The authors find that a rise in government 
spending induces real exchange rate depreciation and a trade balance deficit. 
 
Interaction between monetary and fiscal policy 
Ferrero (2006) analyzes optimal monetary and fiscal policy setting in a currency 
union with two countries. The author includes a role for distortionary taxation and 
government debt, which leads to a modified optimal targeting rule for the union as a 
whole. Beetsma and Jensen (2005) and Gali and Monacelli (2008) have analyzed the 
role of fiscal stabilization policy in the context of a monetary union. Monetary policy is 
conducted by a common central bank, while fiscal policy is implemented at the country 
13
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level. The authors show that there is a stabilizing role for fiscal policy that goes beyond 
the efficient provision of public goods. 
 
3. Modelling strategy 
The modelling strategy adopted consists in the estimation of the following 
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where ),0(~ ,| tsX st , (L) is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of 
the lag operator L, n is the number of variables in the system, t are the fundamental 
economic shocks that span the space of innovations to Xt, and vt is the VAR innovation. 
Equation (2) refers to the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, and it, 
Gt, Tt, t, Yt, Pt,, t  and dt represent, respectively, the interest rate (or the average cost of 
debt refinancing), government primary expenditures and government revenues, 
inflation, GDP, price level, real growth rate of GDP, and the debt-to-GDP ratio at the 
beginning of the period t. Appendix A shows how one can express the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint given in (2). 
Following Favero and Giavazzi (2008), this specification includes the feedback 
from government debt, an assumption that is potentially important in the determination 
of the effects of fiscal policy shocks for a number of reasons.4 First, when fiscal 
authorities have a Ricardian behaviour and care about the stabilization of debt, a 
feedback from the level of debt ratio to government revenue and government spending 
is expected. Second, the debt dynamics may influence interest rates as they depend on 
future expected monetary policy and the risk premium.5 Third, debt may have an impact 
                                                 
4 Note that while Chung and Leeper (2007) linearize the intertemporal budget constraint and impose it as 
a set of cross-equation restrictions on the estimated VAR coefficients, we follow Favero and Giavazzi 
(2008) by adding the government debt to the VAR and appending a non-linear budget identity to 
accumulate debt. 
5 Giavazzi et al. (2000) find that an increase in taxes can raise private consumption in the case of fiscal 
consolidations it moves the economy from an unsustainable fiscal path to a sustainable one. Romer and 
Romer (2007) also find that the effect of a U.S. tax shock on output depends on whether it is motivated by 
the government's desire to stabilize the debt, or is unrelated to the stance of fiscal policy.  
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on inflation and output (Barro, 1974; Kormendi, 1983; Canzoneri et al., 2001).6 
Therefore, it is important to allow for the fact that government revenues, government 
spending, real GDP growth, inflation and the interest rate are linked by the government 
intertemporal budget constraint.7 
Fiscal policy is characterized as follows: 
G
ttt fG )(     (4) 
T
ttt gT )(     (5) 
where, Gt is the government spending, Tt is the government revenue, f and g are linear 
functions, t  is the information set, and 
G
t  and 
T
t  are, respectively, the government 
spending shock and the government revenue shock. The shocks Gt and
T
t are 
orthogonal to the elements in t . 
We follow a recursive identification scheme and assume that the variables in Xt 
can be separated into 3 groups: (i) a subset of n1 variables, X1t, whose contemporaneous 
values appear in the policy function and do not respond contemporaneously to the fiscal 
policy shocks; (ii) a subset of n2 variables, X2t, that respond contemporaneously to the 
fiscal policy shocks and whose values appear in the policy function only with a lag; and 
(iii) the policy variables in the form of government expenditure, Gt, and/or government 
revenue, Tt. 
The recursive assumptions can be summarized by '21 ,,, ttttt XTGXX  and 


















    (6) 
The two upper blocks of zeros correspond, respectively, to the assumptions that 
the variables in X1t do not respond to the fiscal policy shock either directly or indirectly. 
This approach delivers a correct identification of the fiscal policy shock but not of the 
other shocks in the system.8 In practice, we include in our system the same variables as 
                                                 
6 Afonso (2008a, b) reports that it would be wise to reject the debt neutrality hypothesis for the EU and 
that higher government indebtedness can actually deter private consumption. 
7 Appendix A derives the government’s intertemporal budget constraint described by (2). 
8 Since the fiscal policy shock is identified regardless of the ordering restrictions among the non-policy 
variables, we can put arbitrary 0s in the non-policy blocks of 0 in order to obtain (n-1)n/2 linearly 
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in Christiano et al. (2005), but also add housing price among the X1t variables, that is, 
we allow the policy authority to react contemporaneously to changes in the housing 
market. We also include the stock market index and the exchange rate in X2t.  
Finally, we assess the posterior uncertainty about the impulse-response functions 
by using a Monte Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) algorithm. Appendix B provides a 
detailed description of the computation of the error bands. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Building the data set 
This section provides a summary description of the data employed in the 
empirical analysis. A detailed description is provided in Appendix C. We use quarterly 
data for four countries: U.S., U.K., Germany and Italy. All the variables are in natural 
logarithms unless stated otherwise. 
For the identification of the fiscal policy shocks, we use the following variables. 
The variables in X1t - the ones predetermined with respect to fiscal policy innovations - 
are GDP, private consumption, GDP deflator, private investment, wages, and 
productivity. To these variables, we add for the housing price index (or the median sales 
price of new houses sold, in the case of the U.S.), the housing starts (only for the U.S.), 
and the average cost of government debt financing (or the yield to maturity of long-term 
government bonds). The variables in X2t – the ones allowed to react contemporaneously 
to fiscal policy shocks – are the profits, and the money growth rate, to which we add the 
real exchange rate, the S&P500 Index (for the U.S.), the FTSE-All Shares Index (for the 
U.K.), and the MSCI index (for Germany and Italy). As measure of the fiscal policy 
instruments we use either the government expenditures (in which case, the government 
revenues are included in X1t) or the government revenues (in which case, the 
government expenditures are included in X1t). We include a constant (or quarterly 
seasonal dummies), and the government debt-to-GDP ratio in the set of exogenous 
variables. For Germany, we also consider two dummies: (i) one dummy for 1991:1, 
corresponding to the German reunification; and (ii) another dummy for 2000:3, to 
capture the spike in government revenue due to the sale of UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System) licenses. 
                                                                                                                                               
independent restrictions and to get consistent impulse-responses (Christiano et al, 1999). As a result, the 
Choleski decomposition emerges as a particular case, where the restrictions are imposed such that 0 
becomes a lower triangular matrix. 
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Due to limitations of the data, housing starts are included only in the U.S. while, 
for Germany and Italy, profits are not included. For the U.K., we use the M4 growth rate 
instead of the M2 growth rate. Table 1 shows for each country the list of variables 
included in the estimation of the SVAR. 
Among the set of variables included in the SVAR, the average government debt 
cost servicing deserves a special attention. We obtain the average implicit interest rate 
by dividing the net interest payments by the government debt at time t 1. Figure 1 plots 
the average debt cost servicing and the nominal (annualized) GDP growth for the U.S, 
the U.K., Germany, and Italy. It shows that countries have, in general, moved from a 
situation where nominal GDP growth exceeded the cost of financing the debt to a 
situation where the converse has been true. 
The quarterly fiscal data refers to the Federal Government spending and revenue 
in the case of the U.S.A., and the Public Sector spending and revenue in the case of the 
U.K. In both cases, quarterly fiscal data is available directly from national accounts. As 
for Germany and Italy, we compute the quarterly series of government spending and 
revenue using the fiscal cash data, which is monthly published by the fiscal authorities 
of both countries. In this case, data for government spending and revenue refer to the 
Central Government and are available in a cash basis. 
The data cover the following samples: 1970:3-2007:4, in the case of the U.S.A.; 
1971:2-2007:4, in the case of the U.K.; 1979:2-2006:4, in the case of Germany; and 
1986:2-2004:4, in the case of Italy. 
Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 provide a comparison of the annual values of such 
quarterly fiscal data with the annual national accounts data provided by the European 
Commission (Ameco database). It is interesting to observe that the patterns of both 
series are rather similar.9 Moreover, in most of the cases, the levels themselves are also 
close. 
Finally, Figure 6 plots the observed government debt-to-GDP ratio and the 
implicit debt-to-GDP ratio, that is, the one that would emerge by including the feedback 
from government debt. It shows that, despite some small discrepancies in the case of 
Italy, the implicit series for the debt-to-GDP ratio tracks pretty well the actual series. 
The small differences may be due to: (i) the consideration, in some cases, of the central 
                                                 
9 In this context, Pérez (2007) argues that, for some EU countries’, intra-annual cash fiscal information 
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government revenues and expenditures instead of the general government revenues and 
expenditures; (ii) the use, for some countries, of the federal government debt instead of 
the general government debt; (iii) the presence of seigniorage, which is ignored in our 
framework; (iv) the fact that GDP growth rates and inflation rates are computed as 
logarithmic differences which can introduce some approximation errors; (v) the possible 
existence of stock-flow adjustments; and (vi) the inclusion of seasonally adjusted 
measures, namely, in the case of government revenues and expenditures. 
Table 1 summarises the variables to be included in each country’s B-SVAR. 
Table 1 – List of variables included in the B-SVAR. 












































































































































Note: HPt – housing price index; HSt – housing starts; it – average cost of refinancing debt 
or yield to maturity of long-term government bonds; Yt – gross domestic product; Ct – 
private consumption; Pt – GDP deflator; It – private investment; Wt – wages; Prodt – 
productivity; Tt (or Gt) – government revenue (government spending); Gt (or Tt) – 
government spending (government revenue); Proft – profits; Mt – monetary growth rate 
(M2, for U.S., Germany and Italy; M4, for U.K.); SPt – stock prices; ExRt – effective 
exchange rate. Exogenous variables: constant (or quarterly seasonal dummies); Germany 
dummies (1991:1, reunification; 2000:3, UMTS revenues).  
18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 991
January 2009
4.2 Results 
 The starting point is the estimation of a Bayesian Structural VAR (B-SVAR) 
that does not include the feedback from government debt, that is, where equation (2) is 
not considered. Then, we compare the results with the ones that emerge from estimating 
specifications (1), (2), and (3). 
Figures 7, 9, 11, and 13 show the impulse-response functions to a fiscal policy 
shock. The solid line refers to the median response when the VAR is estimated without 
the government budget constraint, and the dashed lines are, respectively, the median 
response and the 68 percent posterior confidence intervals from the VAR estimated by 
imposing the government budget constraint. The confidence bands are constructed using 
a Monte Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) algorithm based on 500 draws. 
 We also show in Figures 8, 10, 12, and 14 the forecast-error variance 
decompositions to a fiscal policy shock, imposing the budget constraint. The thinner 
line corresponds to the median estimate, and the dashed lines indicate the 68 percent 
posterior confidence intervals estimated by using a Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain 
algorithm based on 500 draws. 
 
U.S. 
 Figure 7a displays the impulse-response functions of all variables in Xt to a 
shock in government spending in the U.S. 
 In the case we do not include the debt feedback, it can be seen that government 
spending declines steadily following the shock, and it roughly vanishes after 6 quarters. 
The effects on GDP are small, positive, but not significant. However, they reveal a 
change in the composition of its major components: while government spending shocks 
do not seem to have an impact on private consumption, the effects on private investment 
are rather negative, supporting the idea of a “crowding-out” effect.10 In addition, there is 
a small and negative effect on the average cost of debt. In what concerns the reaction of 
asset markets, the empirical evidence suggests that while there is a positive effect on 
housing prices that persists for almost 12 quarters, the reaction of stock prices is rather 
small, negative and less persistent. Looking at the interaction between fiscal and 
                                                 
10 Fatás and Mihov (2001), when looking at the response to changes in different components of 
government expenditures, find that increases in government consumption are always expansionary, while 
increases in public investment do not have a significant impact on output. Here, we can not analyse some 
of these policy experiments because we have not made explicit the role of different components of 
government spending.  
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monetary policies, there is some support of the idea that an increase in government 
spending leads to a growth in the monetary aggregate, but the effect disappears after 4 
quarters. Finally, the results suggest that after a government spending shock, the real 
effective exchange rate depreciates persistently for almost 12 quarters, although the 
magnitude is relatively small. 
 When we include the debt dynamics in the model, the effects of a government 
spending shock on GDP become smaller. Nevertheless, the effects on private 
investment remain negative while private consumption slightly increases, illustrating 
the wealth effects from government debt. On the other hand, and contrary to the 
previous findings, there is a small but negative effect on the average cost of refinancing 
the debt, which is eventually due to the rise in government revenues that follows the 
shock in government spending. The reaction of asset markets is similar to the model 
without the government constraint: there is a positive and persistent effect on housing 
prices, while the reaction of stock prices is smaller due to the debt dynamics and the 
portfolio reallocation.  
 Figure 7b shows the impulse-response functions to a shock in government 
revenue. The results suggest that government revenue declines steadily following the 
shock which erodes after 8 quarters. Contrary to a shock in government spending, the 
effects on GDP are negative, very persistent, and the trough is reached at after at after 
10 quarters. They also reveal a change in the composition of GDP’s major components: 
while private consumption is negatively impacted by a positive shock in government 
revenues, the effect on private investment is roughly insignificant, despite a small 
positive initial reaction. That is, in this case, the “crowding-out” effect works mainly 
through the consumption channel.  In what concerns the reaction of asset markets, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the effects of revenue shocks tend to be rather 
insignificant: despite a very small positive impact on housing and stock prices that 
persists for around 6 quarters, the effects then revert and disappear. Profits tend to fall 
after an initial increase while productivity is negatively affected by the shock. Finally, 
the results show that after a government revenue shock, the real effective exchange rate 
slightly appreciates. 
Figure 8a plots the forecast error-variance decomposition of all variables in Xt to 
a shock in government spending. Government spending shocks explain a very small 
percentage (around 1 to 2%) of the forecast-error variance decomposition of the 
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majority of the variables. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the government revenue 
shock (Figure 8b). 
 
U.K. 
 The impulse-response functions to a shock in government spending in the U.K 
are shown in Figure 9a. 
While private consumption is not impacted by the spending shock, the effects on 
private investment are rather negative and very persistent, suggesting the idea of a 
“crowding-out” effect via investment. The dynamics of monetary aggregates suggest 
that M4 growth rate falls after the shock, supporting the idea of a monetary policy 
tightening. Housing prices fall after the spending shock while stock prices decline only 
briefly. The effects on wages and productivity tend to be positive. Finally, the results 
suggest that after a government spending shock, the real effective exchange rate 
depreciates persistently for almost 20 quarters, in accordance with the findings for the 
U.S.. 
 Figure 9b shows the impulse-response functions to a shock in government 
revenue. They support the idea of a “crowding-in” effect: private investment reacts 
positively to the shock. The effects on housing prices are also positive, but the reaction 
takes place with a lag of around 8 quarters. Although small in magnitude, the effects on 
profits are negative, while the national currency depreciates in real terms. 
Figure 10a plots the forecast-error variance decomposition of all variables in the 
VAR to a shock in government spending. It shows that the shock accounts for 10% of 
the forecast-error variance of the exchange rate, 5% of the housing prices, and only 3% 
of stock prices. 
Figure 10b displays the forecast-error variance decompositions and shows that 
government revenue shocks represents a large percentage (80%) of the forecast-error in 




We now look at the impulse-response functions a shock in government spending 
for Germany (Figure 11a). The effects on GDP are negative, reflecting the fall in private 
investment. There is, therefore, evidence of a “crowding-out” effect. Government 
spending shocks have a negative and persistent effect on the price level, although very 
21
ECB
Working Paper Series No 991
January 2009
small in magnitude. Housing prices fall after around 10 quarters while stock prices drop 
immediately after the. Both productivity and wages fall with a lag of about 8 to 12 
quarters.  
When we include the feedback from the government debt, the cost of refinancing 
debt becomes positive, therefore, emphasizing the importance of account for debt 
dynamics. 
Figure 11b plots the impulse-response functions to a shock in government 
revenue. Similarly to the U.S., the results show that government revenue declines 
quickly after the shock, eroding after 2 quarters.11 Contrary to the U.S., the effects on 
GDP are positive (although lagged in time. They support the idea of a “crowding-in” 
effect as both private consumption and private investment react positively to the shock. 
Revenue shocks tend to be significant and positive only for housing prices. The 
difference between the U.K. and the German experiences lies, therefore, on the balance 
between the magnitude of the credit channel and the “crowding-in” effect: in the U.K., 
the credit channel is reinforced by a “crowding-in” effect, and, therefore, a positive 
shock in government revenues has an impact of the same signal in housing prices; in 
Germany, the “crowding-in” effect is strong enough to compensate for the rise in the 
interest rates (credit channel). Note also that while in the U.K. the positive revenue 
shock is accompanied by a fall in government spending (therefore, justifying the fall of 
the interest rate), in the case of Germany the shock in government revenues is followed 
by a positive and persistent increase in government spending (consequently, explaining 
the rise of the interest rate). 
The forecast-error variance decompositions to a shock in government spending 
and to a shock in government revenue are displayed, respectively, on Figures 12a and 
12b. Shocks to spending also play an important role for the forecast-error of the price 
level (around 10%), GDP (9%), government revenue (7%) wages (close to 5%), housing 
prices (around 5%), and stock prices (5%). In contrast, revenue shocks explain only a 
negligible percentage of the forecast-error variance decomposition for the majority of 
the variables included in the system. 
 
  
                                                 
11 Afonso and Claeys (2008) mention that large revenue reductions unmatched by expenditure cuts have 
pushed the deficit beyond the 3% threshold in Germany in 2002, putting the country in an excessive 
deficit situation within the EU fiscal framework. 
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Italy 
Finally, we look at the effects of a fiscal policy shock in Italy. Figure 13a 
displays the impulse-response functions to a shock in government spending. Despite a 
very small positive effect in the first quarters, GDP, private consumption, and private 
investment fall, suggesting a “crowding-out” effect. Government spending shocks have 
a positive and persistent effect on the price level. Housing prices seem to be positively 
affected by the shock, while stock prices fall for around 10 quarters.  
 Figure 13b shows the impulse-response functions to a shock in government 
revenue. The effects on GDP, private consumption, and private investment are negative, 
although not persistent as they vanish after 4 to 6 quarters. In consequence, and contrary 
to the U.K., they support the idea of a “crowding-out” effect. Regarding the reaction of 
asset markets, the empirical evidence shows that the effects of government revenue 
shocks tend to be positive for stock prices and negative for housing prices. This 
suggests that while the credit-channel (that is, the fall in interest rates) impacts 
positively in stock markets, for housing markets that channel is annihilated by the 
wages and productivity increase, accompanying the rise of other macroeconomic 
variables. This partially explains why GDP, consumption and investment start 
recovering after around 8 quarters. 
The error-forecast variance decompositions of all variables in Xt to a government 
spending shock and a government revenue shock are plotted, respectively, in Figures 
14a and 14b. They show that fiscal variables account for small percentages of the 
majority of the variables in the VAR. The only exception is the money growth rate, a 
feature that may be explained by the interaction between fiscal policy and monetary 
policy in the early sample observations. 
 
4.3 Fiscal shocks and government debt feedback 
We now consider the potential debt feedback and estimate the following 
structural VAR: 






t t t t
i G Td d
PY
.                 (8)  
The specification of (7) is suggested by the empirical findings in Bohn (1998), 
who estimates a fiscal reaction function in which d* is the unconditional mean of the 
“crowding-out” effects. Finally, the evidence suggests that, after an initial fall, both 
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debt ratio and allow us to take into account the debt feedback. Following Bohn (1998) 
and Favero and Giavazzi (2008), we model the target level of the debt as a constant on 
the basis of the evidence of stationarity of d. In addition, we impose the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint as described by (8). 
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients on (dt 1  d*) in the structural 
equations of the SVAR (government spending and government revenue). We report the 
coefficients (and the standard errors in brackets) taken from the estimation for the full 
sample and for sub-samples. In the case of the U.S., we consider two sub-samples: 
1970:3 – 1987:4, corresponding to the pre-Greenspan era; and 1988:1 – 2007:4, after 
Greenspan. In the case of the Germany, we also split the sample in two periods: 1980:3 
– 1990:4, that is before the reunification; and 1991:1 – 2006:4, that is after the 
reunification. For the U.K. and Italy, each sub-sample is built by splitting the entire 
sample in roughly two sub-samples of similar size. 
 
Table 2 – The effect of (dt-1-d*) in a VAR. 







































































































Note: standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** - statistically significant respectively at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
For the U.S., the results do not show a significant response of revenue and 
primary spending to deviations of the debt-to-GDP ratio from its sample average for 
both the full period and the first sub-sample. In the second sub-sample (1988:1 – 
2007:4), there is some evidence supporting a stabilizing effect of the debt level that 
works mainly through government spending. Indeed, one sees that when the debt-to-
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GDP ratio is above its historical mean, government primary spending decreases (the 
coefficient associated to (dt 1  d*) in the government spending equation is negative 
and significant (-0.719). 
For the U.K., the results show a stabilizing effect of the debt level on the 
primary budget balance that works mainly through the response of government revenues 
to deviations of the debt from the target level. This is, particularly, the case of the full 
sample and the second sub-sample (1985:1 – 2007:4). Therefore, when the debt ratio is 
above its sample mean, it is possible to observe an increase in government revenue 
(0.118, in the full sample; 0.274, for the second sub-sample).  
In the case of Germany, there is evidence of a small stabilizing effect of the debt 
level on the primary surplus that works through the government spending (-0.155). 
Finally, for Italy, one can see that when the debt ratio is above average, 
government spending strongly falls, particularly, in the period 1995:1-2004:4 where the 
coefficient associated to (dt 1  d*) is negative and large in magnitude (-16.469). This is 
in line with the increase of fiscal policy imposed by the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides a detailed evaluation of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
policy. 
We identify fiscal policy shocks using a recursive partial identification, and 
estimate a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression, therefore, accounting for the 
posterior uncertainty of the impulse-response functions. In addition, we explicitly 
include the feedback from government debt in our framework. 
The empirical evidence suggests that government spending shocks: (i) have, in 
general, a small effect on GDP; (ii) do not impact significantly on private consumption; 
(iii) have a negative effect on private investment; (iv) have a varied effect on housing 
prices; (v) lead to a quick fall in stock prices; (vi) do not impact significantly on the 
price level and the average cost of refinancing the debt; (vii) have a small and positive 
effect on the growth rate of monetary aggregates; (viii) lead to a depreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate; and (ix) have a positive and persistent impact on productivity.  
In addition, government revenue shocks:  (i) have a positive (although) lagged) effects 
on GDP and private investment; (ii) have a positive effect on both housing prices and 
stock prices; (iii) in general, do not impact on the price level; and (iv) lead to a 
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. 
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When the debt dynamics is explicitly taken into account, (long-term) interest 
rates and GDP become more responsive and the effects of fiscal policy on these 
variables also become more persistent. 
Finally, the results provide weak evidence of stabilizing effects of the debt level 
on the primary budget balance. 
A natural extension of the current work is related with the identification of the 
fiscal policy shocks. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identify fiscal shocks by exploiting 
decision lags in fiscal policymaking. This approach assumes that: (i) discretionary 
government purchases and revenues are predetermined with respect to the 
macroeconomic variables; and (ii) it uses information about the elasticity of fiscal 
variables to economic activity which enables to identify the automatic response of fiscal 
policy. In this context, Afonso and Sousa (2008) include an identification of the 
automatic response of fiscal policy to macroeconomic variables such as GDP, deflator, 
or interest rate. Whilst narrower in scope – as its goal is solely to understand the 
linkages between fiscal policy and asset markets – than the present work, the estimation 
of a fully simultaneous system of equations in a Bayesian framework can prove to be a 
useful alternative approach, while allowing to assess the robustness of the effects of 
fiscal policy on asset markets. 
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Appendix A. The government’s intertemporal budget constraint 
 
The government’s intertemporal budget constraint can be written as: 
)()1( 1 ttttt TGBiB  
where Bt represents the stock of debt at the end of period t, Bt-1 is the stock of debt at the 
end of period t-1, Gt is the government primary spending during the period t, Tt is the 
government revenue during the period t, and i is the nominal interest. 
Dividing both sides of the last identity by the nominal GDP, PtYt, where Pt is the 
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where t , and t , represent, respectively, the inflation rate and the growth rate of real 
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we can get the following expression 
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This is identical to equation (2) in the text. 
 
Appendix B. Confidence bands of the impulse-response functions 
 
The impulse-response function to a one standard-deviation shock under the 
normalization of I  is given by: 
.)( 10
1LB              (B.1) 
To assess uncertainty regarding the impulse-response functions, we follow Sims 
and Zha (1999) and construct confidence bands by drawing from the Normal-Inverse-
Wishart posterior distribution of B(L) and  
))'(,(~| 1
^
XX        (B.2) 
),)((Wishart~ 1
^
1 mTT                (B.3) 
where  is the vector of regression coefficients in the VAR system,  is the covariance 
matrix of the residuals, the variables with a hat denote the corresponding maximum-
likelihood estimates, X is the matrix of regressors, T is the sample size and m is the 
number of estimated parameters per equation (see Zellner, 1971; Schervish, 1995; and 
Bauwens et al., 1999).  
 
Appendix C. Data description and sources 
 
C.1 U.S. Data 
Housing Sector 
Housing prices are measured using two sources: (a) the Price Index of New One-Family 
Houses sold including the Value of Lot provided by the U.S. Census, an index based on 
houses sold in 1996, available for the period 1963:1-2006:3; and (b) the House Price 
Index computed by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), 
available for the period 1975:1-2007:4. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted. 
 
Housing Market Indicators 
Other Housing Market Indicators are provided by the U.S. Census. We use the Median 
Sales Price of New Homes Sold including land and the New Privately Owned Housing 
Units Started. We seasonally adjust quarterly data for the Median Sales Price of New 
Homes Sold including land using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the 
period 1963:1-2007:4. The data for the New Privately Owned Housing Units Started are 
quarterly (computed by the sum of corresponding monthly values), seasonally adjusted 
and comprise the period 1959:1-2007:4. 
 
GDP 
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5, line 1. Data for GDP 
are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
 
Consumption 
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Tables 2.3.5 and 2.6. Consumption 
is defined as: (a) the expenditure in non-durable consumption goods (line 6) and 
services (line 13) excluding housing services (line 14); and (b) the expenditure in non-
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durable consumption goods (line 3) and services (line 4). Data are quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, and comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, 
and comprise the period 1967:1-2007:4. The source is the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, NIPA Tables 1.1.5 and 1.1.6, line 1. 
 
Investment 
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5. Investment is defined as 
the gross private domestic investment (line 6) excluding residential investment (line 
11). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
 
Wages 
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Tables 2.1 and 2.6. Wages are 
defined as the sum of wages and salary disbursements (line 3). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
 
Productivity 
Productivity is defined as the Nonfarm Business Output Per Hour Index (1992=100) 
("PRS85006093"). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 
1947:1-2007:4. The source is the Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
 
Profits 
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.14. Profits are defined as the 
profits before tax without IVA and CCAdj ("A446RC1", line 32). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
 
Monetary Aggregate 
Monetary Aggregate corresponds to M2. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and 
comprise the period 1960:1-2007:4. The sources are the OECD, Main Economic 
Indicators (series "USA.MABMM201.STSA") and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Release H6. 
 
Stock Market Index 
Stock Market Index corresponds to S&P 500 Composite Price Index (close price 
adjusted for dividends and splits). Data are quarterly (computed from monthly series by 
using end-of-period values), and comprise the period 1950:1-2007:4. 
 
Exchange Rate 
The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Exchange Rate corresponds 
to real effective exchange rate (series “RNUS”). Data are quarterly (computed from 
monthly series by using end-of-period values), and comprise the period 1964:1-2007:4.  
 
Government Spending 
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 3.2. Government Spending is 
defined as primary government expenditure, obtained by subtracting from total Federal 
Government Current Expenditure (line 39) net interest payments at annual rates 
(obtained as the difference between line 28 and line 13). Data are quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:4. 
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Government Revenue 
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 3.2. Government Revenue is 
defined as government receipts at annual rates (line 36). Data are quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, and comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
 
Debt 
Debt corresponds to the Federal government debt held by the public. The source is the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (series “FYGFDPUN”). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:4. 
 
Average Cost of Financing Debt 
The average cost of financing debt is obtained by dividing net interest payments by debt 
at time t-1. 
 
Long-Term Interest Rate 
Long-Term Interest Rate corresponds to the yield to maturity of 10-year government 
securities. Data are quarterly, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:4. The source is the 
OECD, Main Economic Indicators (series "USA.IRLTLT01.ST"). 
 
C.2 U.K. Data 
Housing Prices 
Housing prices are measured using two sources: (a) the Mix-Adjusted House Price 
Index (Feb 2002 = 100) provided by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), 
seasonally adjusted, and available for the period 1968:2-2007:4; and (b) the All-Houses 
Price Index (1952Q4 = 100 and 1993Q1=100) computed by the Nationwide Building 




Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1955:1-




The source is the Office for National Statistics, Release CT, Tables 0.GS.CS, SER.CS 
and NDG.CS. Consumption is defined as the expenditure in non-durable consumption 
goods and services excluding housing services, actual rentals paid by tenants and 
imputed rentals for housing, i.e. UTIJ-[LLKE-(UTZI+ZWUQ)]+UTIN-(BMBT-GBFJ), 
where: "UTIJ" is expenditure in non-durable goods, "LLKE" is expenditure in housing, 
water, electricity, gas and other fuels, "UTZI" is expenditure in water supply, 
"ZWUZQ" is expenditure in electricity, gas and other fuels, "UTIN" is expenditure in 
consumption services, "BMBT" is expenditure in actual rentals paid by tenants, and 
"GBFJ" is expenditure in imputed rentals for housing. Data are quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted, and comprise the period 1963:1-2007:4. 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, 
and comprise the period 1955:1-2007:4. The source is the Office for National Statistics, 
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Investment 
The source is the Office for National Statistics, Release MD (Table 1.10) and Release 
ETAS (Table 2.7). Investment is defined as total gross fixed capital formation (series 
"NPQX") excluding gross fixed capital formation in dwellings by private sector (series 
"DFDF") and gross fixed capital formation by general government (series "NNBF"). 
Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1955:1-2007:4. 
 
Wages 
Wages correspond to U.K. average monthly wages (2000=100). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1963:1-2007:4. The source is Datastream, 
based on IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
Productivity 
The source is the Office for National Statistics, Release PRDY (Table 1) and Release 
MDS (Table 7.2). Productivity is defined as the Index of Output per worker of the 
whole economy (2003=100) (series "A4YM"). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, 
and comprise the period 1959:3-2007:4. 
 
Profits 
The source is the Office for National Statistics, Release UKEA, Tables X1 and X8. 
Profits are defined as the sum of gross trading profits of private non-financial 
corporations both non UKs (series "CAED") and UK continental shelf companies 
(series "CAGD") and financial corporations (series "RITQ"). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1955:1-2007:4. 
 
Monetary Aggregate 
The source is the Office for National Statistics, Release MD, Table 17.5. Monetary 
Aggregate corresponds to: (a) M2 (series "VQWU"); and (b) M4 (series "AUYN"). Data 
are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the periods 1982:3-2007:4 (for M2) and 
1963:1-2007:4 (for M4). 
 
Stock Market Index 
Stock Market Index corresponds to the FTSE-All Shares Index (1962:2=100 or 1962 




The source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Exchange Rate corresponds 
to real effective exchange rate (series “RNGB”). Data are quarterly (computed from 
monthly series by using end-of-period values), and comprise the period 1964:1-2007:4. 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the Office for National Statistics (ONS), Release Public Sector Accounts. 
Government Spending is defined as total current expenditures of the Public Sector ESA 
95 (series “ANLT”) less net investment (series “ANNW”), to which we subtract net 
interest payments (obtained as the difference between interest and dividends paid to 
private sector (series “ANLO”) and interest and dividends received from the private 
sector and the Rest of World (series “ANBQ”). We seasonally adjust quarterly data 
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Government Revenue 
The source is the Office for National Statistics (ONS), Release Public Sector Accounts. 
Government Revenue is defined as total current receipts of the Public Sector ESA 95 
(series “ANBT”). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and 
the series comprise the period 1947:1-2007:4. 
 
Debt 
The source is the Office for National Statistics (ONS), Release Public Sector Accounts. 
Debt is defined as the Public Sector net debt (series “BKQK”). We seasonally adjust 
quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1962:4-
2007:4. 
 
Average Cost of Financing Debt 
The average cost of financing debt is obtained by dividing net interest payments by debt 
at time t-1. 
 
Long-Term Interest Rate 
Long-Term Interest Rate corresponds to the yield to maturity of 10-year government 
securities. Data are quarterly, and comprise the period 1957:1-2007:4. The source is the 
IMF, International Financial Statistics (series "61...ZF"). 
 
C.3 Germany Data  
Housing Prices 
Housing prices correspond to the residential property price index. Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and available for the period 1970:1-2006:4. The source is the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS). 
 
GDP 
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-




The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series 
"IFS.Q.134.9.96.F$C.Z.W.$$$"). Consumption is defined as the private consumption or 
household consumption expenditure including non-profitable institutions serving 




All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics (series "IFS.Q.134.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$”). 
 
Investment 
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics. Investment is defined as total 
gross fixed capital formation (series “IFS.Q.134.9.94.E$C.Z.F.$$$”). Data are 
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Wages 
The source is the OECD, Main Economic Indicators. Wages are defined as the index of 
hourly earnings in manufacturing (series “MEI.Q.DEU.LCEAMN01.IXOBSA”). Data 
are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2006:4. 
 
Productivity 
The source is the OECD, Economic Outlook. Productivity is defined as: the West 
Germany labour productivity of the total economy index (series 
“OEO.Q.WGR.PDTY”), for the period 1970:1990:4; the Germany labour productivity 
of the total economy (series “OEO.Q.DEU.PDTY”), for the period 1992:1-2007:4; and 
the simple average of the two previous indexes, for the period 1991:1-1991:4. Data are 
quarterly, and seasonally adjusted. 
 
Monetary Aggregate 
The sources are the IMF, International Financial Statistics, and the European Central 
Bank (ECB). Monetary Aggregate corresponds to: (a) M2 (series "34..XZF"); or (bi) M1 
(adjusted notional stock); (bii) M2 (adjusted notional stock); (biii) M3 (adjusted notional 
stock). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise, respectively, the periods: 
(a) 1958:1-1998:4; (bi) 1980:1-2007:4; (bii) 1980:1-2007:4; and (biii) 1970:1-2007:4. 
 
Stock Market Index 
Stock Market Index corresponds to the MSCI-Gross Return Index (1969:4=100). Data 




The source is the OECD, Main Economic Indicators. Exchange Rate corresponds to real 
effective exchange rate (series “MEI.Q.DEU.CCRETT01.IXOB”). Data are quarterly, 
and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:4. 
  
Government Spending 
The source is the Bundesbank and the Monthly Reports released by the German 
Ministry of Finance. Government Spending is defined as Central Government total 
expenditure (on a cash basis). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 
ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1979:1-2007:3. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the Bundesbank and the Monthly Reports released by the German 
Ministry of Finance. Government Revenue is defined as Central Government total 
revenue (on a cash basis). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 
ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1979:1-2007:3. 
 
Debt 
The source is the Bundesbank and the Monthly Reports released by the German 
Ministry of Finance. Debt is as the Central, state and local government debt (excluding 
hospitals). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the 
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Average Cost of Financing Debt 
The average cost of financing debt is obtained by dividing net interest payments by debt 
at time t-1. 
 
Long-Term Interest Rate 
Long-Term Interest Rate corresponds to the yield to maturity of 10-year government 
securities. Data are quarterly, and comprise the period 1957:1-2007:4. The source is the 
IMF, International Financial Statistics (series "61...ZF"). 
 
C.4 Italy Data 
Housing Prices 
Housing prices correspond to the residential property price index. Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and available for the period 1970:1-2006:4. The source is the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS). 
 
GDP 
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-20073. 




The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics (series 
"IFS.Q.136.9.96.F$C.Z.W.$$"). Consumption is defined as the private consumption or 
household consumption expenditure including non-profitable institutions serving 




All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1980:1-2007:2. The source is the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics (series “IFS.Q.136.9.9B.BIR.Z.F.$$$”). 
 
Investment 
The source is the IMF, International Financial Statistics. Investment is defined as total 
gross fixed capital formation (series “IFS.Q.136.9.94.E$C.Z.W.$$$”). Data are 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1960:1-2007:3. 
 
Wages 
The source is the OECD, Main Economic Indicators. Wages are defined as the index of 
hourly wage rate index in industry including construction (series 
“MEI.Q.ITA.LCEAMN01.IX”). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise 
the period 1960:1-2006:4. 
 
Productivity 
The source is the OECD, Economic Outlook. Productivity is defined as the Italy labour 
productivity of the total economy index (series “OEO.Q.ITA.PDTY. Data are quarterly, 
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Monetary Aggregate 
The sources are the IMF, International Financial Statistics, and the European Central 
Bank (ECB). Monetary Aggregate corresponds to: (a) M2 (series "34..XZ"); or (bi) M1 
(adjusted notional stock); (bii) M2 (adjusted notional stock); (biii) M3 (adjusted notional 
stock). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise, respectively, the periods: 
(a) 1963:1-1998:4; (bi) 1980:1-2007:4; (bii) 1980:1-2007:4; and (biii) 1970:1-2007:4. 
 
Stock Market Index 
Stock Market Index corresponds to the MSCI-Gross Return Index (1969:4=100). Data 




The source is the OECD, Main Economic Indicators. Exchange Rate corresponds to real 
effective exchange rate (series “MEI.Q.ITA.CCRETT01.IXOB”). Data are quarterly, 
and comprise the period 1970:1-2007:4. 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the Bank of Italy and the Italian Ministry of Finance. Government 
Spending is defined as Central Government total expenditure (on a cash basis). We 
seasonally adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the 
period 1960:1-2007:4. 
Government Spending 
The source is the Bank of Italy and the Italian Ministry of Finance. Government 
Spending is defined as Central Government primary expenditure (on a cash basis). We 




The source is the Bank of Italy and the Italian Ministry of Finance. Government 
Revenue is defined as Central Government total revenue (on a cash basis). We 




The source is the Bank of Italy. Debt is as the stock of General Government short-term 
(“S571730M”), and medium and long-term securities (“S605216M”). We seasonally 
adjust quarterly data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 
1984:4-2007:4. 
 
Average Cost of Financing Debt 
The average cost of financing debt is obtained by dividing net interest payments by debt 
at time t-1. 
 
Long-Term Interest Rate 
Long-Term Interest Rate corresponds to the yield to maturity of 10-year government 
securities. Data are quarterly, and comprise the period 1957:1-2007:4. The source is the 
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